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Abstract. Motivated by the organization of online service systems, we
study models for throughput scheduling in a decentralized setting. In
throughput scheduling, we have a set of jobs j with values wj , processing
times pj , and release dates rj and deadlines and dj , to be processed non-
preemptively on a set of unrelated machines. The goal is to maximize
the total value of jobs scheduled within their time window [rj , dj ]. While
several approximation algorithms with different performance guarantees
exist for this and related models, we are interested in the situation where
subsets of servers are governed by selfish players. We give a universal
result that bounds the price of decentralization, in the sense that any
local α-approximation algorithms, α ≥ 1, yield equilibria that are at
most a factor (α + 1) away from the global optimum, and this bound
is tight. For models with identical machines, we improve this bound to
α
√
e/( α
√
e− 1) ≈ (α + 1/2), which is shown to be tight, too. We also
address some variations of the problem.
1 Model and Notation
We consider a non-preemptive scheduling problem with unrelated machines, to
which we refer as decentralized throughput scheduling problem throughout the
paper. The input of an instance I ∈ I consists of a set of jobs J , a set of
machines M, and a set of players N . Each job j ∈ J comes with a release time
rj , deadline dj , nonnegative value wj and processing time pij if scheduled on
machine i ∈ M. Machines can process only one job at a time. Job j is feasibly
scheduled (on any of the machines) if its processing starts no earlier than rj and
finishes no later than dj . For any set of jobs S ⊆ J , we let w(S) =
∑
j∈S wj be
the total value. Each player n ∈ N controls a subset of machines Mn ⊆M and
aims to maximize the total value of jobs that can be feasibly scheduled on its
set of machines Mn. Here Mn, n ∈ N , is a partition of the set of machines M.
In this paper we are primarily interested in equilibrium allocations, which we
define as a situation in which none of the players n can improve the total value
of jobs that can be feasibly scheduled on its set of machines Mn by removing
some of its jobs and adding some of the yet unscheduled jobs. Note that a player
cannot make a claim on jobs that are scheduled on machines of other players.
Let us denote by w(S) the total weight of jobs in S, for S ⊆ J . An equilibrium
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allocation is a (pure) Nash equilibrium in a strategic form game where player
n’s strategies are the subsets of jobs Sn ⊆ J that can be feasibly scheduled on
machines Mn, and valuations are w(Sn), but with the condition that a strategy
profile (Sn)n∈N is feasible if and only if the sets Sn, n ∈ N , are pairwise disjoint1.
We will refer to these allocations as Nash equilibrium (NE) allocations.
The question if a given player can improve, generally describes an NP-hard
optimization problem. Therefore, we will also consider a relaxed equilibrium
condition: We say an allocation is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium (α-NE)
if none of the players n can improve the total value of jobs that can be feasibly
scheduled on its set of machinesMn by a factor larger than α by removing some of
its jobs and adding some of the yet unscheduled jobs. By the existence of constant
factor approximation algorithms for (centralized) throughput scheduling, e.g. [2,
4], the players are thus equipped with polynomial time algorithms to indeed
reach an α-NE in polynomial time, for certain, constant values of α.
Our main focus will be the analysis of the price of anarchy (PoA) [14], lower
bounding the quality of any Nash equilibrium relative to the quality of a globally
optimal solution. More specifically, we are interested in the ratio
PoA = max
I∈I
max
NE∈NE(I)
w(OPT )
w(NE)
, (1)
where OPT denotes a globally optimal allocation for I, and NE(I) denotes the
set of all Nash equilibria of instance I. Note that OPT is a Nash equilibrium,
too, hence the price of stability, as proposed in [1], trivially equals 1.
2 Motivation, Related Work and Contribution
Our motivation to study this problem is to analyze the performance of decentral-
ized service systems, where jobs are posted, e.g. on an online portal, and service
providers can select these on an take-it-or-leave-it basis. The problem we address
can be seen as a stylized version of coordination problems that appear in several
application domains. We give three examples: (1) When operating micro grids for
decentralized energy production and consumption, the goal is to consume locally
produced energy as much as possible. Here, jobs can be defined as the operation
of appliances, e.g. operating a washing machine), typically bounded by a time
window and attached with a certain $-value. Machines, on the other side, are
local energy producers like PV-panels, micro CHPs or local micro windmills [3,
12]. (2) In cloud computing, service providers such as Amazon and Google pro-
vide an infrastructure service, that is, provide a virtual machine with a specific
service level for a certain period of time. The aim of a federated cloud computing
environment, e.g. [18], is to “coordinate load distribution among different cloud-
based data centers in order to determine optimal location for hosting application
services ”. (3) In private car sharing portals like Tamyca [17] or Autonetzer [16],
1 This is achieved by introducing externalities, letting the valuation of player n be
−∞ whenever Sn is not disjoint with the sets S−n chosen by all other players −n.
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clients post their requests to rent a car for a certain time period, and the price
they are willing to pay. Car owners (private or not) in the neighborhood can
select these requests and rent their car(s).
The underlying non-strategic optimization problem is known in the opti-
mization literature and sometimes referred to as throughput scheduling. See for
example [2], and follow-up papers, e.g. [4]. In the 3-field notation of [8], the
problem reads R|rj |
∑
wjUj , where R denotes the unrelated machine model, rj
specifies that there are nontrivial release dates, and the objective is to minimize
the total weight of late jobs (which is equivalent to the maximization objective
considered here). Approximation algorithms for several versions of the problem
have been discussed in the literature (e.g., with or without weights, identical
or unrelated machines), most notably [2, 4]. Special cases that are of particular
interest are the single machine case with unit weights and zero release dates,
solved in polynomial time by the Moore-Hodgson algorithm [13], and the case
with identical machines and unit processing times, which can be cast and solved
as an assignment problem [5]. To the best of our knowledge, the decentralized
version that we propose here has not been addressed before.
Our main contribution lies in the the informal claim that, in general, the
price of decentralization is very moderate: If local decisions of all players are
approximately optimal with relative performance guarantee α, then any equi-
librium allocation is not worse than an (α + 1)-fraction of the global optimum.
We improve this to ≈ (α + 1/2) when all machines are identical, and the equi-
libria are obtained in a special, sequential way which will be explained later.
In fact, except for the identical machine case, the proofs for the upper bounds
are fairly simple, yet surprisingly universal. Most work lies in the corresponding
tight lower bound constructions.
3 A First Encounter
Example 1. There are two playersN = {1, 2}, each controlling exactly one of two
related machinesM = {1, 2}, with machine speeds s1 = 1, s2 = 23 , respectively2.
There are two jobs J = {1, 2} with processing times p1 = p2 = 1, deadlines d1 =
1, d2 =
3
2 and values w1 = w2 = 1. Release times are 0. When job 1 is allocated to
machine 1 and job 2 to machine 2, both jobs can meet their respective deadlines.
This is obviously an optimal allocation. However when job 2 is allocated to
machine 1, only one job can be scheduled before its deadline. See also Figure 1.
Note that both allocations are a Nash equilibrium. Now w(OPT )/w(NE) =
2/1 = 2 for the second allocation, and we see from this simple example that
PoA ≥ 2
in (1), even for the case of related machines, unit weights, unit processing times
and zero release dates. uunionsq
2 The related machine model is a special case of the unrelated machine model by
letting pij =
pj
si
.
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1
2
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2
3
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p2 = 1, d2 = 1
1
2
p1 = 1, d1 = 1
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2
3
Fig. 1. An optimal solution and a Nash equilibrium in case of related machines
In the next section(s) we argue that PoA = 2 for this problem, and even for the
general decentralized throughput scheduling problem.
4 Upper Bound for Equilibrium Allocations
Players n ∈ N face the computational complexity of computing an optimal
subset of jobs that can be feasibly scheduled on their set of machines Mn, given
the jobs that are available to them. We come back to this issue in the next
section, where we only require that players’ behave approximately optimal. For
the time being, we ignore this issue, and first show that the trivial Example 1
is already the worst case, even for the general model with unrelated machines,
nontrivial release times, arbitrary processing times, and arbitrary job values wj .
Theorem 1. The decentralized throughput scheduling problem has PoA = 2.
The lower bound PoA ≥ 2 even holds for the the special case of unit values wj,
unit processing times pj, related machines and in the absence of release dates.
Proof. PoA ≥ 2 follows from Example 1. The proof of the upper bound follows
the same line as that of [2, Thm 3.2]. Take any instance with optimal solu-
tion OPT and Nash equilibrium NE and let NEn and OPTn, n ∈ N , be the
allocations in NE and OPT , respectively. Now assume for contradiction that
w(OPT ) > 2w(NE)3. Let Y be the set of feasibly scheduled jobs in both OPT
and NE, and let N be the set of jobs feasibly scheduled in OPT but not in NE.
Clearly w(Y ) ≤ w(NE) < 12w(OPT ) = 12 (w(Y ) + w(N)). Hence w(Y ) < w(N),
and therefore,
w(NE) < w(N) .
But now observe that the jobs N are available to the players in the allocation of
NE. By additivity of the objective across players, i.e., w(N) =
∑
n w(N∩OPTn),
3 In a slight abuse of notation, we use OPT and NE to also denote the set of feasibly
scheduled jobs in the respective solutions.
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we conclude that there exists at least one player n for which w(NEn) < w(N ∩
OPTn), and as N ∩ OPTn can be feasibly scheduled on machines Mn, this
contradicts the definition of a Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
5 Upper Bound for Approximate Equilibrium Allocations
The result in Theorem 1 implicitly assumes that players are able to verify that
their strategies are at equilibrium. The players’ problem, however, is polyno-
mially solvable only for special cases, for instance when jobs have unit values
and zero release dates, and when each player controls exactly a single machine.
In that case, the Moore-Hodgson algorithm [13] maximizes the total number of
early jobs. But already here, when players control more than one machine, the
players’ problem is NP-complete as generalization of the makespan minimization
problem on parallel machines, which is NP-complete [7]. When the machines Mn
of a player n are identical, and jobs have unit processing times, the players’ prob-
lem can be cast and solved as an assignment problem [5]. In most other cases,
the players’ problem is NP-complete. For example, for a player that controls a
single machine, when jobs have zero release dates, but arbitrary processing times
and weights, the problem is (weakly) NP-hard [10, 9]. Adding nontrivial release
dates makes the problem strongly NP-hard [11].
Therefore, we also consider a relaxed equilibrium concept, assuming that
players moves are only approximately optimal. This leads to the concept of
α-approximate equilibria, which has lately been discussed in the literature on
computing Nash equilibria, for instance in the context of congestion games [15].
Approximate Nash equilibria can also be defined by allowing additive deviations
instead of relative deviations, e.g. [6], but given that there exist constant-factor
approximation algorithms for throughput scheduling, e.g. [2, 4], it appears more
reasonable to work with relative bounds here. We say the allocation is an α-
approximate Nash equilibrium, or α-NE, if no player n can improve the total
value of its jobs by a factor larger than α, by removing some of its jobs and
adding some of the yet unscheduled jobs. That said, we obtain the following
generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. The decentralized throughput scheduling problem has PoA = α+ 1,
assuming that equilibrium allocations are α-approximate Nash equilibria. The
lower bound PoA ≥ α + 1 even holds for the the special case of unit values wj,
unit processing times pj, related machines and in the absence of release dates.
Proof. The upper bound follows in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1,
and is therefore moved to the appendix. For the proof that PoA ≥ α+ 1, consider
the following instance with unit processing times and values, related machines,
and zero release dates. Consider any rational α = p/q, p ≥ q, and assume players
deploy an α-approximation each. There are q + 1 players N , each controlling
one of q + 1 machines M = {1, . . . , q + 1} with machine speeds s1 = 1 and
s2 = s3 = · · · = sq+1 = 1/(p + ε) for some 0 < ε < 1. There are p + q
jobs J = {1, . . . , p + q}. All jobs have unit processing times and unit weights.
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s1 = 1
di = p+ 
di = p, i = 1 . . . p
s2 =
1
p+
s... =
1
p+
sq+1 =
1
p+
OPT
s1 = 1
α−NE
i = p+ 1 . . . p+ q
s2 =
1
p+
s... =
1
p+
sq+1 =
1
p+
Fig. 2. Optimal solution and α-NE in case of related machines.
Jobs J1 = {1 . . . p} have deadline p. Jobs J2 = {p + 1 . . . p + q} have deadline
p+ ε. Therefore machine 1 can schedule at most p jobs. Machines 2 . . . q+ 1 can
schedule no jobs from J1 and only one job from J2 each. In OPT all p + q jobs
are feasibly scheduled: jobs J1 on Machine 1 and each of machines 2, . . . , q + 1
has one job from J2. Now consider the α-NE where only q jobs are scheduled:
Machine 1 schedules all q jobs from J2, and machines 2 . . . q+ 1 schedule no job.
This is indeed an α-approximate Nash equilibrium, as machine 1 can schedule
at most p = αq jobs, and since all jobs from J2 are scheduled on machine 1,
machines 2 . . . q+ 1 cannot improve from their 0 jobs either. See Figure 2 for an
illustration. We conclude that PoA ≥ (p+ q)/q = α+ 1. uunionsq
6 Sequential Moves of Players
Up to this point our result on the quality of equilibria is universal. Clearly,
determining an order in which players make a move, may improve the resulting
equilibria. We say an equilibrium allocation (α-approximate Nash equilibrium)
is sequential when it can be attained by starting with an empty schedule, and
then sequentially according to some fixed order, allowing each player n to make
a move, that is, selecting the set of jobs Sn. The following example shows that
indeed, not all (α-approximate) Nash equilibria can be obtained sequentially.
Example 2. There are n players controlling one of n machines M = {1, . . . , n}
each, with unit speeds, and 2n− 1 jobs J = {1, . . . , 2n− 1} with unit weights.
Jobs J1 = {1 . . . n} have processing time 1/n and deadline 1. Jobs J2 = {n +
1 . . . 2n−1} have processing time 1 and deadline 1. In OPT machine 1 schedules
jobs J1 and machines 2 . . . n schedule jobs J2. In NE each machine schedules
one job from J1. Note that NE is indeed an equilibrium: No machine can sched-
ule 2 jobs without exchanging jobs with another machine. See Figure 3 for an
illustration. For this instance w(OPT )/w(NE) = 2n−1n → 2 for n → ∞. This
Nash equilibrium cannot be attained sequentially. The first player to move would
necessarily schedule all jobs from J1 on his machine.
uunionsq
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pi =
1
n , di = 1, i = 1 . . . n
NE
pi =
1
n , di = 1, i = 1 . . . n
pi = 1, di = 1, i = n+ 1 . . . 2n− 1
OPT
Fig. 3. Nash equilibrium and an optimal solution in case of identical machines
This example also shows that the identical machine model does not allow an
improvement of the result of Theorem 1.
6.1 A Negative Result for Slowest Machines First
For the lower bound in Example 1, we use related machines (i.e., machines with
speeds). In that example, OPT is obtained as a Nash equilibrium once we assume
that players with slow machines are allowed to select their jobs first. However,
as we show next, this does not improve the price of anarchy in general.
Theorem 3. Consider the special case with related machines, unit weights, ar-
bitrary processing times and zero release dates. Sequential Nash equilibria, where
players move in order of increasing machine speed, still have PoA = 2.
Proof. There are n players controlling exactly one of n machinesM = {1, . . . , n}
with machine speeds sj = 3n+j−1,∀j ∈M. There are 2n jobs J = {1, 2 . . . , 2n}.
All jobs have unit weights. Jobs J1 = {1 . . . n} have processing times pi = n+ i
and deadlines di =
n+i
3n+i−1 . Jobs J2 = {n+1 . . . 2n} have processing times pi = 1
and deadlines di = 1. We may assume that players use optimal algorithms, that
is, the Moore-Hodgson algorithm. In OPT , 2n−1 jobs are scheduled: Machine 1
schedules only job n+ 1. Machines 2 . . . n schedule two jobs each. One from J1,
and one from J2, where machine i schedules job i− 1 followed by job n+ i, for
all i = 2, . . . , n. In NE only n jobs are scheduled, as follows. Machine i schedules
job i for all i ∈M. See Figure 5 in the appendix for an example. Note that this
is a Nash equilibrium corresponding to a sequential schedule where players move
in order of increasing speed. To see this, we show that, when scheduled in order
of increasing speed, no machine could have scheduled 2 jobs. From the jobs in
J1, machine i could have only scheduled job i, since jobs j < i have already
been scheduled by slower machines, and jobs j > i do not meet their deadline
on machine i. Any job from J2 scheduled after i does not meet its deadline,
and any job from J2 scheduled before i causes i to not meet its deadline. Also,
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no machine could have scheduled 2 jobs from J2 since the second job will have
completion time 4n and deadline 1. We get w(OPT )/w(NE) = (2n− 1)/n→ 2
for n→∞. uunionsq
7 Identical machines
In this section we improve our previous result for the case of identical machines.
Recall that in the identical machine model, the processing time of each job is
independent on the machine on which it is scheduled.
7.1 Identical machines: Lower Bound
We start with a lower bound on the price of anarchy for sequential equilibria.
Theorem 4. PoA ≥ α√e/( α√e− 1) for identical machines, even in the restricted
model where the α-approximate NE is obtained sequentially, and for unit pro-
cessing times, unit weights, and zero release dates.
Proof. We give a corresponding example. Again there are n players controlling
one of n identical machinesM = {1, . . . , n}. There are n2 jobs J = {1, 2, . . . , n2}
with unit processing times and unit weights. Jobs have deadlines δ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
and for each deadline, there are n jobs with this deadline, that is, for all δ,
dj = δ for j = 1 + (δ − 1)n, . . . , δn. We refer to jobs as δ-jobs, δ = 1, . . . , n.
In Figure 4 we see an instance for n = 5 and α = 2 (that is, machines use a
2-approximation). For each of the jobs, the number displayed on it corresponds
to its deadline. In OPT , every machine schedules n jobs with different deadlines,
ordered by increasing deadline. Therefore w(OPT ) = n2. We construct an α-
approximate Nash Equilibrium, say S, by sequential moves of players as follows.
For every machine i = 1, . . . , n in this order, we find the maximum number of
jobs that can be scheduled, say Oi, and let Si be the d|Oi|/αe jobs with the
largest deadlines (which are the most flexible jobs). For example, for n = 5 and
α = 2, w(NEα) = 3 + 3 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 12 as can be seen in Figure 4. We bound
w(S) in the following way. In S, denote by rδ(i) the fraction of δ-jobs on machine
i, relative to the total number of jobs on machine i. Let rδ =
∑
i rδ(i). In our
example, r4 = 0 +
1
3 + 1 + 1 + 0. Observe that
∑
δ rδ = n for any allocation. In
S, any machine scheduling a δ-job, does not schedule any (δ + 2)-jobs, or jobs
with larger deadlines, hence it schedules at most d(δ + 1)/αe ≤ (δ + 1 + α)/α
jobs. Therefore, for any δ for which all n δ-jobs are allocated in S, we get
rδ ≥ nα/(δ + 1 + α).
Now, for some δ′ ≥ 0, by construction of the allocation we have that all n
δ-jobs with δ = n − δ′, . . . , n are fully scheduled, as well as a fraction of the
(n− δ′ − 1)-jobs. We get
n ≥
n∑
δ=n−δ′
rδ ≥
n∑
δ=n−δ′
nα
δ + 1 + α
≥
∫ n
δ=n−δ′
nα
(δ + 1 + α) + 1
dδ . (2)
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Fig. 4. Optimal solution and sequential 2-NE in case of identical machines. Numbers
denote job deadlines.
Because the last term is upper bounded by n, we can derive an upper bound
on δ′. In fact, basic calculus shows that
δ′ >
(n+ 2 + α)( α
√
e− 1)
α
√
e
⇒
∫ n
δ=n−δ′
nα
(δ + 1 + α) + 1
dδ > n ,
which together with (2) yields that δ′ ≤ (n+2+α)( α
√
e−1)
α
√
e
. Because all δ-jobs with
δ ≥ n− δ′ are scheduled, we conclude that
w(S) ≤ (δ′ + 1)n ≤ (n+ 4 + α)(
α
√
e− 1)
α
√
e
· n .
We see that
w(OPT )
w(S)
≥ n
α
√
e
(n+ 4 + α)( α
√
e− 1) →
α
√
e
α
√
e− 1 for n→∞ ,
and the claim follows uunionsq
Note that the lower bound construction assumes that players choose the most
flexible jobs first, which seems reasonable. The bound also holds for the case with
unit processing times, where we can even assume that the players use optimal
strategies [5]. Assuming that players indeed act locally optimal, the result shows
that the price of decentralization can be as high as e/(e− 1) ≈ 1.58.
7.2 Identical Machines: Upper Bound
To derive a matching upper bound for identical machines, when moves are se-
quential, we use a proof idea from Bar-Noy et al. [2] in their analysis of k-
GREEDY.
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Theorem 5. PoA ≤ α√e/( α√e− 1) for identical machines and sequential, α-
approximate Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let us assume there are n players and m machines. Each player i con-
trols mi machines. We use a proof idea of [2, Thm 3.3], but need a nontrivial
generalization to make it work also for the case where players control several
machines. The crucial definition is: For a given set of jobs J , denote by γ the
average approximation ratio per machine that is achieved by a single player i
in comparison to OPT (J), where OPT (J) denotes the optimum solution on n
machines and jobs J . Therefore, when Si ⊆ J is the set of jobs scheduled by
player i, w(Si) ≥ miw(OPT (J))/γ.
Suppose we have already determined S1, . . . , Si−1. The jobs in OPT that
have not been scheduled yet have a value w(OPT ) −∑i−1j=1 w(Sj). Therefore,
by definition, w(Si) ≥ mi(w(OPT )−
∑i−1
j=1 w(Sj))/γ. Add
∑i−1
j=1 w(Sj) to both
sides to get
i∑
j=1
w(Sj) ≥ miw(OPT )
γ
+
γ −mi
γ
i−1∑
j=1
w(Sj) (3)
We prove by induction on i that
i∑
j=1
w(Sj) ≥ γ
m′i − (γ − 1)m′i
γm
′
i
w(OPT ) ,
where m′i =
∑i
j=1mj . When i = 1, we show w(S1) ≥ γ
m1−(γ−1)m1
γm1 w(OPT )
in the appendix (Lemma 2). Assume the claim holds for i − 1. Applying the
induction hypothesis to (3) we get
i∑
j=1
w(Sj) ≥ miw(OPT )
γ
+
γ −mi
γ
· γ
m′i−1 − (γ − 1)m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
w(OPT )
This yields the inductive claim, as shown in the appendix (Lemma 3). Hence we
get for i = n (see also [2, Thm 3.3])
w(α-NE) =
n∑
j=1
w(Sj) ≥ γ
m − (γ − 1)m
γm
w(OPT ) .
Next observe γ ≤ mα. This follows because w(S1) ≥ OPT 1/α ≥ m1OPT/(mα),
for any instance. Here OPT 1 denotes the optimal schedule for player 1. We get
PoA ≤ γ
m
γm − (γ − 1)m ≤
(mα)m
(mα)m − (mα− 1)m ≤
α
√
e
α
√
e− 1 , (4)
where the second inequality in (4) follows from basic calculus, and the third
inequality follows because the right hand side is exactly the limit for m → ∞,
and the series bm = (mα)
m/((mα)m − (mα− 1)m) is monotone in m, with
b1 = α ≤ α
√
e/( α
√
e− 1). uunionsq
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Theorems 4 and 5 yield PoA = α
√
e/( α
√
e− 1) for identical machines with se-
quential moves of the players. Basic calculus shows that α+ 12 ≤ α
√
e/( α
√
e− 1) ≤
α+ 1e−1 for α ≥ 1. Also, for α→∞ this value approaches α+ 12 . Note that for
α = 1,PoA = e/(e− 1) ≈ 1.58.
7.3 Universal Bound for Identical Machines
In this section we show that the bound PoA =
√
e/(
√
e− 1) for identical ma-
chines with unit processing times, unit weights and zero release dates is universal,
i.e., it also holds without requiring that the Nash equilibria are obtained sequen-
tially. Note that, due to unit processing times, it is reasonable to assume that
players’ strategies are optimal. Also note that, once processing times are arbi-
trary, Example 2 gives a lower bound of 2, matching the universal upper bound
of 2 in Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Consider any instance with identical machines, unit processing times,
unit weights and zero release dates. There exists a worst case Nash Equilibrium
that is obtained sequentially.
Proof. We construct a specific Nash equilibrium (sequentially) and show that
this must be worst case. Consider the greedy algorithm G that considers jobs
in order of non-increasing deadlines, and greedily assigns the jobs, first to the
machines of player 1, then the remaining jobs to the machines of player 2, etc.
Clearly, this gives a Nash equilibrium. Observe that, once a job j can’t be sched-
uled on machines of player i, the remaining jobs from j + 1, . . . , n can’t be
scheduled either. However when j can be scheduled on some machine of player
i, instead of j any of the remaining jobs from j + 1, . . . , n could be scheduled
as well. This follows because all of the jobs sitting in front of j, if any, have
deadlines at least that of j, and thus can be shifted one time slot if j is removed.
So for any other job h > j, a free time slot at time 0 can be made available.
Assume the equilibrium allocation S resulting from G is not worst case. Then,
specifically there exists a job j, scheduled on some machine m of some player i,
which is the first job for which the following holds: when jobs 1 . . . j are allocated
according to G, it is not possible to augment this partial allocation to a Nash
equilibrium worse than S (using any allocation of the remaining jobs). However
when jobs 1 . . . j − 1 are allocated according to G, this can be augmented to a
worst case Nash equilibrium W . Consider the partial allocation of {1, . . . , j− 1}
according to G. Since j can be feasibly allocated to a machine of player i, so
can jobs j + 1, . . . , n. Therefore, since W is a Nash equilibrium, some job h > j
is allocated to a machine of player i. But now we can remove h from i, and
replace it by j. If h (or any other unscheduled job) can be feasibly allocated
to the player where j used to be, we do so. In any case, the result is a worst-
case Nash equilibrium as well. However, this worst-case Nash equilibrium has
jobs 1, . . . , j allocated according to G, a contradiction. We conclude that the
allocation produced by G is a worst-case Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
We conclude with the following theorem.
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Theorem 6. The decentralized throughput scheduling problem with identical ma-
chines, unit processing times, unit weights and zero release dates has PoA =√
e/(
√
e− 1).
Acknowledgements. Thanks to Johann Hurink for some helpful discussions
on the context of the problem.
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8 Appendix
Theorem 2. The decentralized throughput scheduling problem has PoA = α+1,
given that equilibrium allocations are α-approximate Nash equilibria.
Proof. We still have to argue that PoA ≤ α+ 1. Take any instance with optimal
solution OPT and α-approximate Nash equilibrium NE and let NEn and OPTn,
n ∈ N , and be the allocations in NE and OPT , respectively. Now assume for con-
tradiction that w(OPT ) > (α+ 1)w(NE). Let Y be the set of feasibly scheduled
jobs in both OPT and NE, and let N be the set of jobs feasibly scheduled in OPT
but not in NE. Clearly w(Y ) ≤ w(NE) < 1α+1w(OPT ) = 1α+1 (w(Y ) + w(N)).
Hence w(Y ) < 1αw(N), and therefore,
w(NE) <
1
α
w(N) .
But again, the jobs N are available to the players in the allocation of NE. By
additivity of the objective across players, i.e., w(N) =
∑
n w(N ∩ OPTn), we
conclude that there exists at least one player n for which w(NEn) <
1
αw(N ∩
OPTn), and as N ∩ OPTn can be feasibly scheduled on machines Mn, this
contradicts the definition of an α-approximate Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Illustration. We here give an example for the instance described in the proof
of Theorem 3.
s2 = 3n+ 1
s1 = 3n
si = 3n+ i− 1
sn = 4n− 1
p1 = n+ 1, d1 =
n+1
3n
p2 = n+ 2, d2 =
n+2
3n+1
pi = n+ i, di =
n+i
3n+i−1
pn = 2n, dn =
2n
4n−1
pn+2 = 2n, dn+2 = 1
pn+i+1 = 2n, dn+i+1 = 1
p2n = 2n, d2n = 1
s2 = 3n+ 1
s1 = 3n
si+1 = 3n+ i
sn = 4n− 1
p1 = n+ 1, d1 =
n+1
3n
pi = n+ i, di =
n+i
3n+i−1
pn−1 = 2n− 1, dn−1 = 2n−14n−2
pn+1 = 2n, dn+1 = 1
NEOPT
Fig. 5. Sequential NE in order of increasing speed and optimal solution.
Lemma 2.
w(S1) ≥ γ
m1 − (γ − 1)m1
γm1
w(OPT ) .
Proof. We know by definition of γ
w(S1)
w(OPT )
≥ m1
γ
.
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We prove by induction on mi that, for any i,
mi
γ
≥ γ
mi − (γ − 1)mi
γmi
.
When mi = 1, we get
1
γ
≥ γ − (γ − 1)
γ
=
1
γ
,
which clearly holds. Assume the claim holds for mi − 1. We get
mi
γ
=
mi − 1
γ
+
1
γ
≥ γ
mi−1 − (γ − 1)mi−1
γmi−1
+
1
γ
=
γmi − γ(γ − 1)mi−1
γmi
+
γmi−1
γmi
=
γmi − (γ − 1)mi
γmi
.
uunionsq
Lemma 3.
mi
γ
+
γ −mi
γ
· γ
m′i−1 − (γ − 1)m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
≥ γ
m′i − (γ − 1)m′i
γm
′
i
.
Proof. We have
mi
γ
+
γ −mi
γ
· γ
m′i−1 − (γ − 1)m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
=
mi
γ
· (γ − 1)
m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
+
γm
′
i−1 − (γ − 1)m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
. (5)
From the proof of Lemma 2 we get
mi
γ
· (γ − 1)
m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
≥ γ
mi − (γ − 1)mi
γmi
· (γ − 1)
m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
.
Hence we get the following lower bound for (5)
γmi − (γ − 1)mi
γmi
· (γ − 1)
m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
+
γm
′
i−1 − (γ − 1)m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
= 1− (γ − 1)
mi
γmi
· (γ − 1)
m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
.
Observe that m′i = m
′
i−1 +mi, which yields
1− (γ − 1)
mi
γmi
· (γ − 1)
m′i−1
γm
′
i−1
=
γm
′
i − (γ − 1)m′i
γm
′
i
.
uunionsq
